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17	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT					
18	DISTRICT OF NEVADA					
19	ORACLE USA, INC., a Colorado corporation; ORACLE AMERICA, INC., a Delaware	Case No. 2:10-cv-0106-LRH-VCF				
20	corporation; and ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a California corporation,	ORACLE'S NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY				
21	Plaintiffs,	REGARDING ITS MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES				
22		(ECF NO. 917).				
23	V.					
24	RIMINI STREET, INC., a Nevada corporation; AND SETH RAVIN, an individual,					
25	Defendants.					
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/ X						

1	On June 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,		
2	Case No. 15–375, 2016 WL 3317564, clarifying how courts should evaluate applications for		
3	attorneys' fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act. Because Kirtsaeng is controlling		
4	authority regarding Oracle's pending Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, ECF No. 917		
5	("Motion" or "Mot."), Oracle files this Notice of Supplemental Authority.		
6	In Kirtsaeng, the Court reversed a denial of attorneys' fees to Supap Kirtsaeng. The		
7	Court had ruled in Mr. Kirtsaeng's favor on the merits of his copyright claim in 2013 in a case		
8	regarding the Copyright Act's first-sale doctrine. Kirtsaeng at 1-2. On remand, the district court		
9	then denied Mr. Kirtsaeng's application for attorneys' fees on grounds that the lawsuit against		
10	him had been objectively reasonable under then-current Second Circuit law, id. at 2-3, and that		
11	"the imposition of a fee award against a copyright holder with an objectively reasonable—		
12	although unsuccessful—litigation position will generally not promote the purposes of the		
13	Copyright Act," id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit affirmed. Id.		
14	The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's opinion, directing that court on remand		
15	to evaluate Mr. Kirtsaeng's fee motion by "giving substantial weight to the reasonableness of		
16	Wiley's litigating position, but also taking into account all other relevant factors." <i>Id.</i> at 12.		
17	Kirtsaeng also offered two specific examples where "a court may award fees even though the		
18	losing party offered reasonable arguments":		
19	For example, a court may order fee-shifting because of a party's litigation		
20	misconduct, whatever the reasonableness of his claims or defenses Or a court may do so to deter repeated instances of copyright infringement or overaggressive		
21	assertions of copyright claims, again even if the losing position was reasonable in a particular case.		
22	Id. at 10-11 (internal citation omitted). Kirtsaeng also confirmed that a fee award that exceeds		
23	the amount of damages awarded serves the purposes of the Copyright Act: "When a litigant—		
24	whether plaintiff or defendant—is clearly correct, the likelihood that he will recover fees from		
25	the opposing (i.e., unreasonable) party gives him an incentive to litigate the case all the way to		
26	the end even if the damages at stake are small." <i>Id.</i> at 7.		
27	Kirtsaeng supports Oracle's application for attorneys' fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 for		
28	three reasons. First, Rimini's systemic advancement of objectively unreasonable factual and		

1 legal positions substantially weighs in Oracle's favor. Compare Kirtsaeng at 6-7, 12 with Mot. 2 at 2-7, 10-12 (summarizing Rimini's objectively unreasonable positions and conduct) and 3 May 25, 2016 Hearing Tr. at 18:17-21:4 (same). Second, other relevant factors such as Rimini's litigation misconduct, Mot. at 2-7, deterrence of future infringement (including by repeat 4 5 infringers), id. at 11, incentivizing innovators to protect their intellectual property, id. at 12, and 6 the need to fully compensate Oracle, id. at 10, 13, all weigh in Oracle's favor; the first two such 7 factors, litigation misconduct and deterrence, are grounds that would independently support a fee 8 award. See Kirtsaeng at 4 (discussing additional factors identified in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 9 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994)); Kirtsaeng at 10-11 (identifying litigation misconduct and 10 deterrence as independent grounds for a fee award). Third, Oracle's requested fee award may permissibly exceed the damages awarded in this case. *Id.* at 7. 11 Kirtsaeng also disposes of Rimini's arguments against a fee award. Rimini's primary 12 13 ground for opposing Oracle's Motion was that the jury's advisory finding of innocent 14 infringement outweighed all other potentially relevant factors, and that a finding of willfulness was in fact required to support an award attorneys' fees. Opp'n to Oracle's Mot. for Attys.' Fees 15 16 and Costs, ECF No. 998 ("Opp'n") at 1, 9-11, 12, 13 & n.2, 16, 19; May 25, 2016 Hearing Tr. at 17 41:4-7 ("Our position, Your Honor, is that the finding by the jury that Rimini Street's infringement, in its exoneration of Mr. Ravin for any copyright liability, is alone sufficient to 18 19 award denial of attorneys' fees."). Rimini is wrong: Kirtsaeng, like its predecessors, makes no such pronouncement—determinations of innocence and willfulness in the context of statutory 20 21 damages are not identified as relevant factors at all, let alone as gatekeeping factors for a discretionary fee award under § 505. The issue of a defendant's willfulness turns on the party's 22 state of mind at the time of infringement, while Kirtsaeng instructs that a court should examine 23 24 the losing party's "litigating position," which largely involves conduct after the infringement at issue. Kirtsaeng at 6. Rimini wrongly asserts that a party that has not engaged in willful 25 26 infringement is free to engage in the sort of obstructionist litigation tactics Rimini employed here, 27 including destroying evidence, asserting baseless counterclaims, advancing baseless 28 infringement defenses that were disposed of at summary judgment, and defeating part of a

1	summary judgment motion by arguing that Rimini used JD Edwards and Siebel software only for					
2	archival purposes and then immediately conceding at trial that this position was untrue. See Mot.					
3	at 2-7. Under Kirtsaeng, the reasonableness (or lack thereof) of these litigation positions is					
4	important in determining whether a fee should be awarded. See Kirtsaeng at 6-7.					
5	Kirtsaeng makes clear that Rimini's objectively unreasonable factual and legal positions					
6	throughout the litigation, Rimini's litigation misconduct, and the need for deterrence, would					
7	each, alone, be sufficient to support a fee award under Kirtsaeng; the other factors identified by					
8	Oracle further support an award here.					
9						
10	Dated: June 24, 2016	MODO	GAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP			
11		MORG	JAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLF			
12		By:	/s/ Thomas S. Hixson			
13			Thomas S. Hixson Attorneys for Plaintiffs Oracle USA, Inc.,			
14			Oracle America, Inc. and			
15			Oracle International Corporation			
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1	<b>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</b>					
2	I certify that on June 24, 2016, I electronically transmitted the foregoing <b>ORACLE'S</b>					
3	NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY REGARDING ITS MOTION FOR					
4	COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES (ECF NO. 917) together with Exhibit A to the Clerk's					
5	Office using the Electronic Filing System pursuant to Local Rules Section 1C.					
6	Dated: June 24, 2016	Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP	Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP			
7						
8		By: /s/ Thomas Hixson				
9		Thomas Hixson Attorneys for Plain	tiffs			
10		Oracle USA, Inc Oracle America, Inc	. and			
11		Oracle International Cor	poration			
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